Security
Without Safety
The post-2009 militarised order in Sri Lanka's North-East has not delivered the safety its proponents promised — by metrics the Sri Lankan state itself measures.
What the militarised order said it would deliver
After May 2009, the Sri Lankan state and its supporters made a specific promise to the people of the Northern and Eastern provinces: a permanent, large-scale military presence was the price of safety. Without it — they said — there would be insecurity, terror, lawlessness, and the return of violence.
Sixteen years later, that promise can be tested against measurable outcomes. The metrics below are not from TLTE. They are from the United Nations, from the Sri Lankan Government's own Police Narcotics Bureau, and from established human-rights organisations cited by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office.
Five measurable failures, in the record
Each item below is a documented finding by a Tier A (UN / state) or Tier B (established NGO / journalism) source. Click any citation marker to read the source itself.
Sexual violence has continued — under militarisation
OHCHR (Jan 2026) finds that militarisation and emergency legal frameworks have created an environment in which gender-based violence — including sexual violence — continued to be reported after the conflict. Survivors describe an enduring climate of surveillance, intimidation and harassment.[A1]
Surveillance and intimidation are routine, not exceptional
Adayaalam (Feb 2025) and HRW (Sept 2025) document a persistent culture of surveillance and intimidation targeting Tamil journalists, families of the disappeared, MPs, and human-rights defenders — including police visits to homes, questioning of children, and PTA detentions.[B1],[B2]
Drug economies operate openly under heavy militarisation
Tamil Guardian (2021) reports community testimony — amplified by then-Northern Province Chief Minister C.V. Wigneswaran (2015) — that drug networks operate "despite the area being heavily militarised and under intense surveillance." NDDCB 2024 confirms drug arrests in the North-East are rising from a low base.[B3],[A4]
Land remains militarily occupied; sites are contested
PEARL, Adayaalam and the Oakland Institute document continuing military land occupation, state-backed religious construction at Hindu sites including Kurunthoormalai, and demographic restructuring of historically Tamil-majority areas — sixteen years after combat ended.[B4],[B5],[B6]
Accountability has not arrived; impunity is entrenched
UN High Commissioner Volker Türk (June 2025): "impunity remains entrenched, and the structural conditions that led to past violations persist." HRW (Sept 2025) records over 100 sets of remains at Chemmani mass-grave site by July 2025; at least 20 mass graves discovered island-wide.[A5],[A2],[B2]
A phantom that is real
The strongest current Tier B documentation of the post-2009 order is Adayaalam Centre for Policy Research's February 2025 report A Phantom that is Real: Persisting Culture of Surveillance and Intimidation in the North-East.[B1]
"A widely held belief among the international and diplomatic community is that normalcy has returned to Sri Lanka following the end of the armed conflict in 2009. This narrative of post-war peace and stability is in stark contrast to the true condition of the Northern and Eastern Provinces."
"They monitor our comings and goings; know all our network; have individual profiles on us; call us and visit our houses to intimidate us."
"Every day the police are visiting my house."
"Sometimes they [police] approach our children to get information about us. That is a type of threat."
- May 2024 — Tamil families in Muttur and Kalmunai banned from serving Mullivaikkal commemorative kanji; STF deployed.[B1]
- Tamil MP Thurairajah Ravikaran repeatedly arrested and harassed.[B1]
- Hindu temples at Kurunthoormalai and Vedukkunarimalai targeted; Buddhist construction at Kurunthoormalai by Department of Archaeology and Sri Lankan army "in violation of multiple court orders."[B1]
- Continued use of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) to detain activists for "organising remembrance events or advocating for accountability."[B1],[B2]
Not a quantity claim — a governance-failure claim
The honest reading of the National Dangerous Drugs Control Board's 2024 data is this: the North-East is not Sri Lanka's drug-arrest centre. Western Province alone records 156,512 drug arrests in 2024 against 3,806 across the entire Northern Province.[A4]
What is exceptional about the North-East is not the arrest count. It is the credibility of community, civil-society and elected-official allegations that drug economies operate openly under the most heavily militarised administration on the island.
| Jaffna (Northern) | 2,063 |
| Vavuniya (Northern) | 799 |
| Mullaitivu (Northern) | 311 |
| Kilinochchi (Northern) | 231 |
| Northern Province total | 3,806 |
| Eastern Province total | 4,833 |
| Western Province total (comparison) | 156,512 |
| Sri Lanka — island total | 228,450 |
"Tamil locals state that various gangs are involved in illegal activities within the areas of Mullaitivu and that Sri Lankan security forces, including the police, are assisting these groups… despite the area being heavily militarised and under intense surveillance."
"Tamil youth are being pushed into drugs and prostitution with the help of the Sri Lankan military."
The OHCHR finding the petition rests on
We do not aggregate counts. We defer to OHCHR, ITJP and PEARL on survivor numbers. The single strongest current finding is from the OHCHR thematic report "We Lost Everything – Even Hope For Justice", 13 January 2026.[A1]
"Militarisation and emergency legal frameworks have created an environment in which gender-based violence — including sexual violence — continued to be reported after the conflict."
Survivors describe "an enduring climate of surveillance, intimidation, and harassment, contributing to under-reporting, deep stigma, and the near-absence of effective remedies."
"Sexual violence is a torture that never stops."
This page does not collect survivor reports, does not name survivors, and does not aggregate CRSV counts. Per Magalir Avai safety rules, all survivor support must be sought through the services listed in the safeguarding block below — not through TLTE.
Occupation that did not end
Buddhist temple constructed by the Department of Archaeology and the Sri Lankan army on a Hindu site, in violation of multiple court orders.[B1]
Hindu temple complex contested under state-backed archaeological intervention; documented by Adayaalam 2025.[B1]
Pre-2017 troop-to-civilian ratios documented by PEARL/ACPR. Among the highest in the world. Subsequent reductions are partial and disputed.[B5]
Continued military occupation of private and Hindu temple lands; insufficient civilian land restitution. (Oakland Institute, 2015.)[B6]
What the UN's senior human-rights official said in 2025
UN High Commissioner Volker Türk visited Sri Lanka in June 2025, including the Chemmani mass-grave site. His findings are now the most current Tier-A statements available to a UK Member of Parliament.[A5]
"Sri Lanka has struggled to move forward with domestic accountability mechanisms that are credible and have the trust and confidence of victims. This is why Sri Lankans have looked outside for justice, through assistance at the international level."
"Impunity remains entrenched, and the structural conditions that led to past violations persist."
"By late July 2025 the remains of over 100 people, including children, suspected to have been victims of extra-judicial killings by the Sri Lankan army, had been discovered, but lawyers working on the case believe the site may contain many more… At least 20 mass graves have been discovered throughout the island, often by accident."
"Sri Lanka has one of the world's highest rates of enforced disappearances, numbering in the tens of thousands."
What the prior authority did, and what came after
Opponents of demilitarisation argue that without the current military presence, the safety of civilians in the North-East would collapse. This argument deserves a serious answer.
The honest answer requires holding two findings together without flinching:
The UN Panel of Experts (2011) documents serious findings against the LTTE — including the use of civilians as human shields, forced recruitment including of children, killing of civilians attempting to flee LTTE-controlled areas, and suppression of internal dissent. The LTTE is a proscribed organisation in the United Kingdom under the Terrorism Act 2000. Nothing on this page expresses support for, or glorifies, that organisation.[A3]
The same UN Panel of Experts (2011) and the OHCHR OISL (2015) document credible findings against the Sri Lankan Government — widespread shelling causing large numbers of civilian deaths, shelling of UN hubs, hospitals and "no fire zones," summary executions, sexual violence, and torture. OISL: there are "reasonable grounds to believe that gross violations… were committed by all parties," and many allegations "may amount to war crimes… and/or crimes against humanity."[A3],[A2]
A documented observation, weighed honestly
N. Malathy — a New Zealand-based Tamil diaspora computer scientist who served as Secretary of the North East Secretariat on Human Rights inside the prior de-facto authority from 2005 to 2009 — describes, in A Fleeting Moment in My Country (2012), a policed public order in which women's institutional participation was structurally encouraged.[C1] Her observation cannot be the basis of any political argument on its own. It is cited here only to test a measurable outcome: the participation of women in public institutions.
On that single measurable outcome, weighed against the simultaneous UN PoE findings on forced recruitment and suppression of dissent, the evidence does not support the claim that the current militarised order delivers even the floor of public participation by women that the prior contested authority delivered — by the OHCHR's own 2026 finding that women remain in "an enduring climate of surveillance, intimidation, and harassment."[A1],[A3],[C1]
The architecture of insecurity
Each of the failures above feeds the next. This is not an accident of policy — it is a self-reinforcing system that produces the conditions used to justify its own continuation.
- 1A heavy military presence is installed.It is justified by claims of insecurity.
- 2Civilian institutions are starved or sidelined.Police, courts, and elected officials in the North-East operate under constant military overlay.
- 3Surveillance and intimidation become routine.OHCHR, HRW, Adayaalam: families of the disappeared, journalists, MPs, defenders are visited, watched, detained.
- 4Drug, land, and shadow economies grow under that overlay.Documented allegations: the security apparatus tolerates or facilitates them — the very harms a security force is supposed to prevent.
- 5The resulting harm is then cited as proof more militarisation is needed.The system reproduces its own justification.
Accountable civilian protection — not 'no security at all'
Demilitarisation in the petition's sense does not mean abandoning the population of the North-East to lawlessness. It means replacing the current military administration of the North-East with the model the OHCHR OISL (2015) recommended a decade ago.[A2]
Five things this brief does not say
The LTTE is a proscribed organisation in the United Kingdom under the Terrorism Act 2000. Nothing on this page expresses support for, or glorifies, that organisation. The UN PoE 2011 findings against the LTTE are cited and accepted.
The petition is directed at the policy of post-2009 militarisation as a state choice. It is not directed at the Sinhalese people, the Sinhalese language, or the Buddhist religion.
The petition's three asks — Westminster Hall debate, PMQ, constituent letter on OSLAP — are lawful parliamentary process. They do not advocate a unilateral declaration of independence.
This page is research and policy advocacy. It does not collect survivor reports. Survivors must seek the services in the safeguarding block — not contact TLTE.
We do not aggregate counts of conflict-related sexual violence or enforced disappearances. We defer to OHCHR, PEARL, ITJP and HRW.
The alternative is accountable civilian protection on the OHCHR OISL 2015 model. Replacing a military administration with a constitutional one is not lawlessness.
What we are asking a Member of Parliament to do
These are the only asks. They are lawful, parliamentary, and consistent with stated UK foreign-policy positions on Sri Lanka.
On post-war militarisation of the North-East and its measurable safety outcomes — citing OHCHR (Jan 2026), OISL (2015) and Türk (June 2025).
On UK FCDO posture toward renewal of the OHCHR Sri Lanka Accountability Project (OSLAP) mandate at the UN Human Rights Council.
Urging the UK to (a) support OSLAP mandate renewal, (b) press Colombo to grant OSLAP investigators in-country access, (c) support accountability under existing UK universal-jurisdiction provisions for the international crimes documented by OISL 2015.
If you or someone you know needs immediate help
- 999 — police, ambulance (emergencies)
- 0808 2000 247 — National Domestic Abuse Helpline (Refuge, 24h, free, confidential)
- Sri Lanka: Women In Need (WIN) — 077 567 6555
- Tamil Nadu: Women's helpline — 181
Velicham, Kaaval, the Magalir Avai pages, and this Security Without Safety page are not emergency services. They do not store, forward, or process incident reports. For survivor support, contact the services above.